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Abstract
This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and
incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econo-
metrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more
general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s
dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium
refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more per-
missive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium
refinement in such games.
Keywords Dominance solvability · Vector payoffs · Incomplete preferences ·
Multicriteria games · Equilibrium refinement
JEL Classification D1 · D2 · D4 · D10
1 Introduction
This paper studies dominance solvability in multicriteria games, i.e. games in
which the players’ payoffs are generally multidimensional or vector-valued. Such
higher payoff dimensionality may be relevant, for example, when modeling firms
that compete in prices for profits as well as market share (Bade 2005; Mármol
et al. 2017) or in quantities under demand uncertainty (Caraballo et al. 2015).
It is also relevant in the analysis of commons exploitation when players have
equity considerations in addition to a payoff capturing their personal gains (Lejano
and Ingram 2012). Other potential domains of application of such games are
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multi-product auctions, multi-issue voting and bargaining among altruistic play-
ers.
The paper’s main motivation for studying dominance solvability in the general class
of multicriteria games comes from noting that, owing to the often severe multiplicity of
generalized Nash equilibria in such games (Shapley 1959), there appears to be a need
for solution concepts that offer plausible equilibrium refinements. Such refinements
would allow for increased predictive sharpness and, possibly, descriptive relevance
within the context of this modeling apparatus. Potentially, they may also help towards
making multicriteria games more “friendly” in the economic analysis of strategic
interaction.
A reasonable starting point in this endeavour is to turn to the influential notion
of sophisticated equilibrium that was introduced in Moulin (1979, 1986) for stan-
dard real-payoff games. In that context, dominance solvability can lead the analyst to
discard equilibria in which some player employs a strategy that is iteratively weakly
dominated. Similar to Moulin’s work, the goal of this paper is to provide a solution
concept that builds on a notion of generalized weak dominance which, whenever appli-
cable, eliminates generalized equilibria in which some player’s strategy is iteratively
dominated.
To this end, the most direct generalization of weakly dominated strategies in the
class of multicriteria games is considered first, requiring one strategy to dominate
another for some player if it results in a weakly greater vector payoff against all oppo-
nent profiles and strictly so against some such profile. A notion of iterative dominance
solvability that builds on this definition is then introduced, extending Moulin’s (1979)
notion to the present environment. The paper’s main result is that finite multicriteria
games that are dominance solvable in this sense are necessarily generalized equilib-
ria. As such, it includes the main result in Moulin (1979) as a special case where all
players’ payoffs are real-valued.
A less demanding solution concept of iterative dominance that is based on the more
general notion of partially dominated strategies is introduced next. A strategy is said
to be partially dominated by another for some player, if there is no opponent strategy
profile at which the former does better (in the vector-dominance sense) and at the same
time there is some such profile where the latter does better. This can be thought of as a
“reason-based” decision rule (see also Gerasimou 2016 for a related choice-theoretic
analysis) that a possibly bounded-rational player in such an environment might employ
to make strategic choices. It is shown by example, however, that, when applicable, the
solution concept associated with this notion of dominance may fail to select a set of
generalized equilibria.
2 Multicriteria games and generalized equilibria
A multicriteria game is a collection (Si , vi )Ii=1, where I is the number of players,
Si is player i’s pure strategy set, S = ∏Ii=1 Si is the set of all strategy profiles, and
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vi : S → Rni is player i’s payoff function, with ni ≥ 1 holding for every i ≤ I . It
will be assumed that players, strategies and payoff dimensionalities are all finite. Such
a multicriteria game will, therefore, be referred to as finite.
For s, s′ ∈ S and i ≤ I , the following notation will be used:
vi (s) ≥ vi (s′), if v ji (s) ≥ v ji (s′) for all j ≤ ni
vi (s) > vi (s
′), if vi (s) ≥ vi (s′) and vi (s) = vi (s′).
(1)
As is standard in this literature (Zhao 2018 is a recent survey), it is assumed through-
out that all players’ payoffs are ordered as in (1), and that this is common knowledge.
Such an assumption is obviously suitable when the modeler knows that all players’ true
preferences do actually coincide with the canonical partial ordering on the Euclidean
space that pertains to their payoffs—intuitively, when they are unable to resolve trade-
offs across their different payoff dimensions—and this fact is commonly known in the
game. Moreover, as pointed out in Bade (2005), the assumption is also relevant when
the modeler is actually ignorant about the players’ true (and possibly complete) prefer-
ences. In this case, employing the vector-dominance partial ordering—and allowing,
in principle, for the possibility that the associated partial preferences may be com-
pleted in player-specific ways—ensures that no plausible preference profiles are a
priori ruled out.
A strategy profile s ∈ S in a multicriteria game is a (pure strategy) generalized
Nash equilibrium if, for all i ≤ I ,
vi (s
′
i , s−i ) ≯ vi (si , s−i ) for all s′i ∈ Si . (2)
If s is a generalized equilibrium, then a unilateral deviation by some player that results
in a gain in some payoff dimension also results in a loss in some other dimension.
When ni = 1, for all i , this definition reduces to that of ordinary pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Focusing on zero-sum, two-person multicriteria games, Shapley (1959) was the
first to analyze the above solution concept, which is sometimes referred to as Pareto
equilibrium in the literature (Voorneveld et al. 1999). Also focusing on this class
of games, Blackwell (1956) studied the minimax solution. An important result that
goes back to Shapley (1959) is that if the players’ vector payoffs are “scalarized”
by means of a suitable, player-specific vector of convex weights that are attached
in a consistent manner to each player’s payoff dimensions, then every generalized
Nash equilibrium of the game can be obtained as the possibly unique equilibrium
of the corresponding scalarized game under some set of scalarization weights for all
players.
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3 Weak dominance solvability as an equilibrium refinement
Given a multicriteria game (Si , vi )Ii=1, a strategy s′i of player i will be said to weakly
dominate s′′i in S if
vi (s
′
i , s−i ) ≥ vi (s′′i , s−i ) for all s−i ∈ S−i
and
vi (s
′
i , s−i ) > vi (s′′i , s−i ) for some s−i ∈ S−i
(3)
This obviously coincides with the standard definition of weak dominance whenever
ni = 1. For S′ ⊆ S, let U (S′) denote the set of strategy profiles s ∈ S such that si
is not weakly dominated for any player i ≤ I . It will then be said that a multicriteria
game is weakly dominance solvable if there exist S1, S2, . . . , Sk ⊆ S, k < ∞, such
that S = S1, S j+1 = U (S j ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, U (Sk) = Sk and, for every
player i and all s˜i , ŝi ∈ Ski , vi (˜si , s−i ) ≶ vi (̂si , s−i ) for all s−i ∈ Sk−i .
The above definition encompasses that of dominance solvability in the sense of
Moulin (1979) as a special case when ni = 1 for all i ≤ I . Moreover, as in Moulin
(1979), the dominated strategies of all players are eliminated in each round. As is well
known, this assumption is not without loss of generality. Contrary to what happens
when payoffs are real-valued, however, in general situations where a multicriteria
game is weakly dominance solvable, the players’ payoff functions are not required to
be constant at the solution set. Intuitively, when payoffs are real-valued, the players’
indifference between two strategies conditional on an opponent strategy profile is cap-
tured by equality of their payoffs. When the latter are multidimensional, the proposed
notion of weak dominance solvability effectively extends the definition of indifference
to vector equality or incomparability according to the canonical partial ordering in
Euclidean space. As such, this indifference relation is generally intransitive.
The set of pure-strategy-generalized Nash equilibria of a multicriteria game will be
denoted by N (S). If such a game is weakly dominance solvable, its solution set will
be denoted by Dw(S).
Proposition 1 If a finite multicriteria game is weakly dominance solvable, then
Dw(S) ⊆ N (S).
Proof Suppose S is weakly dominance solvable. Let Ŝ ⊆ S and assume to the contrary
that there is s ∈ Ŝ such that s ∈ N (U (Ŝ)) and s /∈ N (Ŝ). Then, for some player i and
strategy s′i ∈ Ŝi \ Ui (Ŝi ) it holds that
vi (s
′
i , s−i ) > vi (si , s−i ). (4)
Since s′i ∈ Ŝi \Ui (Ŝi ), there exists s′′i ∈ Ŝi that weakly dominates s′i in Ŝ. In particular,
vi (s
′′
i , ŝ−i ) ≥ vi (s′i , ŝ−i ) for all ŝ−i ∈ Ŝ−i . (5)
It follows from (4) and (5) that
vi (s
′′
i , s−i ) > vi (si , s−i ). (6)
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Since s ∈ N (U (Ŝ)), (6) implies s′′i ∈ Ŝi \ Ui (Ŝi ). Therefore, s′′i is also weakly
dominated in Ŝ by another strategy si ∈ Ŝi which, in view of the above, is such that
si /∈ Ui (Ŝi ) too. Upon applying this argument recursively and recalling that Ŝi is finite
one concludes that there exists s∗i ∈ Ŝi \ Ui (Ŝ) such that s∗i weakly dominates in Ŝ
every s˜i ∈ Ŝi \ Ui (Ŝ). Since s∗i ∈ Ŝi \ Ui (Ŝ), there exists s∗∗i ∈ Ui (Ŝ) such that
s∗∗i weakly dominates s∗i in Ŝ. Moreover, since si , s∗∗i ∈ Ui (Ŝ) and s ∈ N (U (Ŝ)), it
follows that
vi (s
∗∗
i , s−i ) ≶ vi (si , s−i ). (7)
From (4) and also from the definitions of s∗∗i , s′i we get
vi (s
∗∗
i , s−i ) ≥ vi (s′i , s−i ) > vi (si , s−i ). (8)
This implies
vi (s
∗∗
i , s−i ) > vi (si , s−i ) (9)
which contradicts (9). Therefore, it holds that
N (U (Ŝ)) ⊆ N (Ŝ). (10)
Now, since the game is weakly dominance solvable, there exist S1, . . . , Sk such that
S = S1, S j+1 = U (S j ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and Sk = U (Sk) ≡ Dw(S). It
follows from the definition of Dw(S) that
Dw(S) = N (Dw(S)). (11)
Since N (U (Ŝ)) ⊆ N (Ŝ) for all Ŝ ⊆ S and S j+1 = U (S j ), it follows from (10) and
(11) that
N (S) = N (S1) ⊇ N (S2) ⊇ · · · ⊇ N (Sk) = Dw(S).
unionsq
Proposition 1 includes Moulin’s (1979) Proposition 1 as a special case when all
players’ payoffs are real-valued. In the spirit of Moulin (1986), in those dominance-
solvable multicriteria games where the solution set is a proper subset of the game’s
set of equilibria, one may refer to those selected by the above solution concept as
sophisticated generalized equilibria. An example illustrating the elicitation of such
equilibria is given in the game below:
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L M R
U (2, 2),
(
2
2
)
(3, 2),
(
2
1
)
(4, 4),
(
1
1
)
M (2, 1),
(
3
2
)
(2, 2),
(
2
2
)
(4, 4),
(
5
5
)
D (1, 1), 44 (5, 5),
4
4 (3, 3),
3
3
Here, the pure-strategy-generalized equilibria are (U , L) and (M, R). In the first
round, M is eliminated by both players as weakly dominated by U and L , respectively,
while D and R are removed in the second round as dominated by U and L , respectively.
This leads to the unique prediction (U , L).
4 Partial dominance solvability and non-equilibrium solutions
Towards examining the robustness of the above equilibrium refinement in the class
of multicriteria games, a generalization of the notion of weak dominance between a
player’s strategies is now introduced. Specifically, given such a game (Si , vi )Ii=1, a
strategy s′i will be said to partially dominate another strategy s′′i in S if
vi (s
′′
i , s−i ) ≯ vi (s′i , s−i ) for all s−i ∈ S−i
and
vi (s
′
i , s−i ) > vi (s′′i , s−i ) for some s−i ∈ S−i
Partial dominance generalizes weak dominance in multicriteria games whenever ni >
1, while it reduces to it—and hence to the standard definition of weak dominance—
when ni = 1. A strategy s′i will be referred to as partially dominant in S if s′i partially
dominates every other si ∈ Si and the opponents’ strategy profiles are drawn from
S−i . A strategy profile s ∈ S will also bear this name whenever si is partially dominant
in S for every player i ≤ I .
The next claim follows immediately from the definitions.
Observation 1 If s ∈ S is a partially dominant strategy profile in a multicriteria game,
then s ∈ N (S).
Now, for S′ ⊆ S let P(S′) ⊆ S′ denote the set of all strategy profiles s ∈ S′ that
obtain after every partially dominated strategy s′i ∈ S′i has been removed by every
player i ≤ I . Also, write Pi (S′) for the set of player i’s strategies in S′i that are
not partially dominated in S′. A multicriteria game (Si , vi )Ii=1 is said to be partially
dominance solvable if there exist S1, S2, . . . , Sk , k < ∞, such that S = S1, S j+1 =
P(S j ) for all j ≤ k − 1, P(Sk) = Sk , and for every player i and all si , s′i ∈ Ski ,
vi (si , s−i ) ≶ vi (s′i , s−i ) for all s−i ∈ Sk−i . If such a game is partially dominance
solvable, its solution set will be denoted by D p(S).
Observation 2 There exist partially dominance solvable multicriteria games such that
N (S) = ∅ and D p(S) ∩ N (S) = ∅.
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To verify, consider the following game:
A B C D
U (2, 3),
(
1
1
)
(2, 5),
(
3
3
)
(2, 5),
(
3
1
)
(3, 5),
(
3
2
)
M (2, 4),
(
3
2
)
(5, 3),
(
3
1
)
(4, 4),
(
2
3
)
(3, 4),
(
3
2
)
D (2, 2), 33 (3, 5),
2
3 (3, 4),
3
2 (4, 3),
2
3
Its pure-strategy-generalized equilibria are (M, A) and (M, C). In the first round
of elimination, D is removed by the row player as partially dominated by M , and C
by the column player as partially dominated by D. In the second round, A is removed
as partially dominated by D. In the third round, M is removed as partially dominated
by U , while in the final round, D is removed as dominated by B. The unique partial-
dominance solution is, therefore, (U , B), at which profile the row player profitably
deviates to D.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Bade, S.: Nash equilibrium in games with incomplete preferences. Econ. Theory 26, 309–332 (2005)
Blackwell, D.: An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs. Pac. J. Math. 6, 1–8 (1956)
Caraballo, M.A., Mármol, A.M., Monroy, L., Buitrago, E.M.: Cournot competition under uncertainty:
conservative and optimistic equilibria. Rev. Econ. Des. 19, 145–165 (2015)
Gerasimou, G.: Partially dominant choice. Econ. Theory 61, 127–145 (2016)
Lejano, R.P., Ingram, H.: Modeling the commons as a game with vector payoffs. J. Theor. Polit. 24, 66–89
(2012)
Mármol, A.M., Monroy, L., Caraballo, M.A., Zapata, A.: Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and prefer-
ence information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly. Theory Decis. 83, 365–383 (2017)
Moulin, H.: Dominance solvable voting schemes. Econometrica 47, 1337–1351 (1979)
Moulin, H.: Game Theory for the Social Sciences. New York University Press, New York (1986)
Shapley, L.S.: Equilibrium points in games with vector payoffs. Naval Res. Logist. Q. 6, 57–61 (1959)
Voorneveld, M., Vermeulen, D., Borm, P.: Axiomatizations of pareto equilibria in multicriteria games.
Games Econ. Behav. 28, 146–154 (1999)
Zhao, J.: Three little known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley. Games Econ Behav
108, 466–477 (2018)
123
